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INTRODUCTION
Over the last years, third-party financing (TPF) of litiga-
tion1 has received considerable attention from both legal com-
mentators and economists. Legal commentators have mainly
* Copyright © 2016 byJef De Mot and Michael Faure. Jef De Mot is a
Professort at the Research Foundation Flanders, Ghent University.
** Copyright © 2016 byJefDe Mot and Michael Faure. Michael Faure is
a Professor at Maastricht University and Erasmus University Rotterdam.
1. Also called third-party funding of litigation. We will use both terms
interchangeably throughout the article.
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examined whether third-party litigation financing agreements
violate the common law doctrines of maintenance and cham-
perty.2 Economists have investigated whether allowing third
parties to finance litigation will result in the filing of more law-
suits,3 encourage the filing of frivolous claims,4 discourage set-
tlement,5 remedy the imbalance of power that favours defend-
ants in settlement negotiations,6 whether class actions magnify
the potential effects,7 etc. One aspect which has been largely
overlooked however is how third-party financing may affect
the litigation expenditures in individual cases. It is often
claimed that third-party financing increases total itigation
costs, but this is largely based on the expectation that TPF in-
creases the volume of litigation, rather than the costs of indi-
vidual cases. An examination of this issue is warranted given
that third-party financing influences several elements which
have an impact on the parties' litigation efforts and thus on
the social costs of litigation. One prominent effect is the relax-
ation of budget constraints.8 In this article, we use rent-seeking
theory to examine how the relaxation of budget constraints
influences the litigation expenditures of the parties. Rent-seek-
ing models are increasingly used to study the behaviour of liti-
2. The United States Supreme Court defines maintenance as "helping
another prosecute a suit" and champerty as "maintaining a suit in return for
a financial interest in the outcome." See In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 124 n.15
(1978). Although there have been few prosecutions for champerty or main-
tenance in the last century, the doctrines are still considered valid in the
U.S. By contrast, most Australian states have abolished those doctrines. See
Daniel L. Chen & David S. Abrams, A Market for Justice: the Effect of Litigation
Funding on Legal Outcomes, 15 U. PA.J. Bus. L. 1075, 1083 (2013) [hereinafter
Chen & Abrams, A Market for Justice].
3. See, e.g., Paul H. Rubin, Third-Party Financing of Litigation, 38 N. Ky. L.
REv. 673, 681-85 (2011); Chen & Abrams, A Market for Justice, supra note 2.
4. See, e.g., Isaac Marcushamer, Note, Selling Your Torts: Creating a Market
for Tort Claims and Liability, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1543, 1604 (2005); Rubin,
supra note 3.
5. See, e.g., Jason Lyon, Revolution in Progress: Third-party Funding of Amenri-
can Litigation, 58 UCLA L. R~v. 571, 595 (2010);Jonathan T. Molot, A Market
in Litigation Risk, 76 U. CHI. L. Rhv. 367 (2009).
6. See, e.g., Susan Lorde Martin, Litigation Financing: Another Subprime In-
dustry that Has a Place in the United States Market, 53 VILL. L. R.v. 83, 84-85
(2008).
7. See, e.g., Deborah R. Hensler, Third-Party Financing of Class Action Liti-
gation in the United States: Will the Sky Fall?, 63 DEPAUL L. REv. 499, 509-16
(2014).
8. See, e.g., Chen & Abrams, A Market for Justice, supra note 2, at 1077.
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gants during trial.9 These models take into account that the
parties can influence their probability of success by investing
more effort in finding factual evidence and legal arguments in
their favor (e.g. through letting their lawyer work more hours
on the case). These models add reality to the economic theory
of litigation. They have delivered several theoretical results
that have been empirically confirmed.1 0 In this essay we show
that, in contrast to what intuition may suggest, relaxing budget
constraints does not necessarily increase litigation expendi-
tures. Due to strategic interaction between the parties, de-
pending inter alia on the strength of the claim, expenditures
under TPF may either decrease or increase. Interestingly, ex-
penditures are more likely to decrease for meritorious suits
and more likely to increase for relatively weak cases.
This article unfolds as follows: In the next section (I), we
explain how economic models predict the effort levels of the
parties and the various elements that influence the expendi-
tures. We also discuss the empirical support for these theories.
Section II examines how third-party financing may influence
key determinants of litigation effort. Section III contains a for-
mal model, and section IV discusses the findings of our model.
9. See, e.g., Jef Dc Mot, Comparative Vesus Contributory Negligence: A Corn
parison of the Litigation Expenditures, 33 INT'L REv. L. & ECON. 54 (2013);Jef
De Mot & Thomas J. Miceli, Comparing All-or-Nothing and Proportionate Dam-
ages: A Rent-Seeking Approach, 11 REv. L. & ECON. 1 (2015) [hereinafter De
Mot & Miceli, Comparing AllorNothingl; Amy Farmer & Paul Pecorino, Legal
Expenditures as a Rent-Seeking Game, 100 PUB. CHOICE 271 (1999); Jack Hirsh-
lcifer & Evan Osborne, Truth, Effort, and the Legal Battle, 108 Pun. CH IOICE 169
(2001); Avcry Katz, Judicial Decisionmahing and Litigation Expenditure, 8 INT'L
REv. L. & ECON. 127 (1988); Francesco Parisi & Barbara Luppi, Litigation as
Rent Seeking, in COMPV4ION TO TIFE POLITIC'& Econtotv OF RENT SEEIuNG 293
(Roger D. Congleton & Arye L. Hillman eds., 2015); Jef De Mot, Barbara
Luppi & Francesco Parisi, Are Sequential Trials Really Better than Unitary Trials?,
(June 8, 2015) (unpublished manuscript), http://economix.fr/pdf/work
shops/20159law economics/BLuppi.pdf.
10. See infra Section I.B; see alsoJef De Mot, Litigation Success Functions, in
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON ECONOMIC MODELS OF LAW 165 (Thomas J. Miceli
& Matthew J. Baker eds., 2013) [hereinafter De Mot, Litigation Success Func-
tions].
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I.
THE ECONOMICS OF LITIGATION EXPENDITURES
In order to understand the effect of TPF on the effort
levels of the parties and on the likelihood that the particular
suit will be brought, we will first present the simple economic
model of litigation, explaining that the success rate of the
plaintiff (for example a victim in a tort case) will depend upon
the efforts invested by that plaintiff in convincing the court of
the merits of his case. Obviously, the final outcome will equally
depend upon similar efforts taken by the defendant. We dis-
cuss this in subsection A. Next we will review the empirical
literature which has tested the extent to which the theoretical
model can be relied upon (e.g. what is the relationship be-
tween the amount at stake and the effort levels of the parties,
and can we empirically establish what theory predicts about
the behavior of the parties?). This is done in subsection B. Fi-
nally, subsection C provides a brief summary.
A. Litigation Success Functions
If we want to predict how much effort a litigant will spend
to convince the court and what the key determinants of these
effort levels are, we need an explicit function for the
probability of a plaintiff victory. In the literature, these litiga-
tion success functions usually take the following form:
P(X,Y) -XF XF Y -F) X1F + (1 -F)
The plaintiff wants to maximize her or his expected value,
which equals the probability of winning times the amount at
stake, minus her or his litigation expenditures (which are
equal to the litigation effort times the unit costs of litigation):
EV, = p(X,Y)j - C X
The defendant wants to minimize her or his expected
loss, which equals the probability of winning times the amount
at stake, plus her or his litigation expenditures:
EV =p(X,Y)J+CdY
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with X and Y the effort levels" I of the plaintiff and the defen-
dant respectively, F the degree of defendant fault (with
0<=F<=I; this can also be seen as the inherent quality of the
case), J the monetary stakes of the case (e.g. if the plaintiff
wins, the court will award an award of J = $100,000), and Cp
and Cd the unit costs of the plaintiff and defendant respec-
tively (e.g. the hourly fee of the lawyer).12 One could think of
the simple example of a tort victim who suffered harm as the
result of a traffic accident and who wishes to bring a lawsuit
against the defendant. The likelihood of success of the victim
will depend upon the efforts the victim spends in convincing
the judge of the merits of his case, (for example providing dec-
larations and testimony of witnesses who were present at the
scene of the accident). This we denote as X. It equally depends
upon the efforts taken by the defendant who could obviously
equally invest in finding arguments that deny the claim of the
plaintiff, which is denoted at Y. F (the defendants fault) repre-
sents the inherent merit of the claim. A value of F close to 0
represents a claim with virtually no merit, a value of F close to
1 represents a very strong claim. For example, if the defendant
drove much faster than legally allowed, F would be close to 1.
This function (the relationship between the probability of
success and the factors X, Y, and F) obviously has the following
features:3 (1) The determinants of success include both the
degree of defendant fault and the litigation effort of the par-
11. It is easiest o think of effort levels as the number of hours spent on a
case.
12. Interestingly, the formula for the plaintiffs win rate can be derived in
four different ways: stochastic, axiomatic, optimally-derived, and microfoun-
dcd. See I lao Jia ct al., Contest Functions: Tluoretical Foundations and Issues in
Estimation, 31 INT'LJ. INDUS. ORG. 211 (2013). In stochastic derivations, ef-
fort is a noisy contributor to some output, and the outcome of the contest is
determined by a comparison of the outputs of the players. Axiomatic deriva-
tions link combinations of axioms to functional forms. In optimal design
derivations, a designer with specific objectives about effort or other variables
designs the contest, and the functional form is then a result of such a design.
Microfounded derivations derive contest functions by characterizing envi-
ronments in which they naturally emerge as win probabilities of the contes-
tants (e.g. incomplete information, search-based and Bayesian foundations);
see also De Mot, Litigation Success Functions, supra note 10.
13. See Hirshleifer & Osborne, supra note 9.
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ties; 1 4 (2) The probability of a plaintiff victory depends on the
ratio of the effort levels, hence the term "ratio form" is used
for this functional form; (3) For a very close case (F=1/2), the
outcome at trial depends only upon the litigation efforts; (4)
Given equal efforts, the outcome depends only on the degree
of fault; (5) If the defendant is totally in the wrong (F=I), she
always loses as long as the plaintiff makes some effort (X>O);
and (6) If the defendant is totally without fault (F=O), she al-
ways wins as long as she makes some effort (Y>O).
B. Are These Functions Realistic?
Several articles that rely on these litigation success func-
tions have produced results that have been empirically con-
firmed.15 It is important to stress that the literature indicates
that the relationship between the several factors we have indi-
cated above (X, Y, and F) is quite accurate in many respects.
More particularly, the literature has examined how these vari-
ous elements are related to each other, that is how they mutu-
ally influence each other. A first example concerns "strategic
reciprocality."'16 To describe this phenomenon, it is necessary
to introduce some definitions. A party's effort is called provoca-
tive when a marginal increase in her effort leads to an increase
in her opponent's effort.' 7 A party's effort is called deterring
when a marginal increase in her effort leads to a decrease in
her opponent's effort. The favorite is the party with a greater
than fifty percent probability of winning, and the underdog is
the party with a less than fifty percent probability of winning.
Strategic reciprocality means that at the (Nash) equilibrium
one party's effort is provocative and one party's effort is deter-
ring. The models using the ratio form lead to such a result: the
14. The final outcome of the case will obviously depend upon the merit
of the case (F), but also upon the efforts taken by victim (X) and defendant
(Y) to convince the judge.
15. See, e.g., George B. Shepherd, An Empirical Study of the Economics of
Pretrial Discovery, 19 INT'L REV. L. & EcoN., 245 (1999); James S. Kakalik et
al., Discovery Managemont: Further Analysis of the Civil Justice Reform Act Evalua-
tion Data, 39 B.C. L. REv. 613, 648 (1997-1998); Thomas E. Willging et al.,
An Empirical Study of Discovery and Disclosure Practice Under the 1993 Federal Rule
Amendments, 39 B.C. L. REv. 525, 532 (1997-1998).
16. Katz, supra note 9.
17. One can think of the example where the plaintiff comes with one
additional witness, thus leading to additional efforts of the defendant as well
(for example, providing a report by an expert in traffic accidents).
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effort of the favored party is deterring and the effort of the
underdog is provocative. In other words, the underdog will
spend less when the favored party increases his effort, and the
favored party will spend more when the underdog increases
his effort. This can be explained intuitively. When the favored
party increases his effort, the case becomes even less close. It
becomes less worthwhile for the underdog to spend more.
When the underdog increases his effort, the case becomes a
closer one. It becomes more worthwhile for the favorite to
spend more. Shepherd made an empirical study18 of the eco-
nomics of pretrial discovery in 1999.19 His findings are in ac-
cordance with strategic reciprocality. The author examined
369 United States federal cases in which the attorneys of both
sides provided information about the number of days they de-
voted to seeking discovery.20 Further information was available
through court docket sheets and written questionnaires. Shep-
herd found that plaintiffs and defendants behave very differ-
ently when conducting discovery. When the plaintiff engages
in excessive discovery,21 the defendant retaliates. The plaintiff
on the contrary retreats when the defendant engages in exces-
sive2 2 discovery.23 Note that the result of Shepherd implies
18. Shepherd, supra note 15. Shepherd uses data from a survey that re-
searchers at Columbia University conducted in 1962 and 1963 to assess the
consequences of the discovery provisions in the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure. The author argues that the data is still relevant despite its age (over
forty years). This is because the discovery rules have not changed substan-
tially after the survey. Although approximately one third of the states intro-
duced a requirement of automatic disclosure, discovery not within the scope
of automatic disclosure is still subject to the 'old' rules. Moreover, about two
thirds of states still follow the system without automatic disclosure.
19. During pretrial discovery, the parties can force each other to disclose
documents and other evidence relevant for the case.
20. With exclusion of the days the litigant devoted to responding to the
requests of the other party.
21. Excessive according to the defendant.
22. Excessive according to the plaintiff.
23. See Shepherd, supra note 15, at 260. Shepherd also looks at 'normal'
(contrary to excessive) discovery behavior: plaintiffs choose an amount of
discovery that reflects the case's underlying fundamentals, like the amount
at stake or the number of factual issues. They do not raise their level of
discovery when the defendant increases his discovery effort. The defendant
however does not look at the fundamentals of the case, but rather mimics
the plaintiff: when the plaintiff chooses one unit of discovery, he chooses
one unit of discovery himself.
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that discovery may produce efficiency and justice since the
plaintiff bases his discovery amount on the fundamentals of
the case. At the same time, the fact that the defendant behaves
strategically without looking at the fundamentals of the case
directly leads to social waste and injustice.
24
A second result that has been empirically validated con-
cerns the influence of an increase in the (monetary) stakes on
the expenditures of the parties. In theoretical models that use
the ratio form, an increase in the stakes (e.g. when we look at
cases in which the damage is $200,000 instead of $100,000)
induces both parties to increase their effort since the marginal
value of effort rises. Increased stakes lead to an increase in ex-
penditures. Empirical studies have indeed found a strong cor-
relation between the stakes and the efforts of litigants. Kakalik
found that "higher stakes are associated with significantly
higher total lawyer work hours, significantly higher lawyer
work hours on discovery, and significantly longer time to dis-
position."25 More exactly, "median total lawyer work hours
were more than two and a half times larger for cases with mon-
etary stakes over $500,000 than for cases with monetary stakes
of $500,000 or less, while mean total lawyer work hours were
almost four times larger."26 Willging found that "the size of the
monetary stakes in the case had the strongest relationship to
total litigation costs of any of the characteristics we studied."27
P(X, Y) =-
Third, in its simplest version, X + Y, the model
predicts that each party spends one fourth of the amount at
stake in litigation expenditures. Also in the more complex caseIX
P(X,Y) = FX
of fiX + (1- F)Y, each party spends approximately
one fourth of the amount at stake if the case is a close one
(F=1/2). This result has been shown to be valid in experimen-
tal simulations. More concrete, Eastman and Viswanath ana-
lyze the litigation expenditure decisions of parties in a setting
in which litigants believe that they can outsmart, (or be out-
24. See Shepherd, supra note 15, at 263.
25. Kakalik et al., supra note 15, at 648.
26. Id.
27. Willging et al., supra note 15, at 532.
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smarted by,) the other litigant in making spending decisions.
28
Litigants were told that their probability of victory was equal to
the ratio of their effective litigation spending to that of the
other side. The instructions explained that effective litigation
spending could be equal to actual dollars spent, but could also
be higher or lower than actual spending. The litigants were
told that the effectiveness of their spending would be deter-
mined based on an outside evaluation. The case involves a car
accident with stipulated damages of $100,000. Litigants were
given the option of spending on several categories (e.g., legal
research, hiring a detective, etc.). They were not given the op-
portunity to settle the case. The authors found that the re-
spondents spent an average of $30,000, which is relatively close
to and statistically not different from the prediction of the ra-
tional choice theory described above, which would put ex-
penditures at one fourth the amount at stake in the litigation,
$25,000.
Fourth, the model predicts that when the parties have
more or less equal access to evidence, the plaintiff will spend
the same amount as the defendant (for any given case quality).
This finds some confirmation in the experimental study of
Eastman and Viswanath (2003).29 In most cases, the parties
spent a similar amount.
II.
HIGH COSTS, BUDGET CONSTRAINTS AND THEIR CONSEQUENCES
A. The Costs of Civil Cases
High levels of litigation costs are a concern in the United
States as well as in Europe. In the United States, in cases with
one or more types of discovery, median litigation costs, includ-
ing attorneys' fees, are $15,000 for plaintiffs and $20,000 for
defendants.30 In Europe, the average cost of a civil case varies
enormously among countries. For example, the cost of a sim-
ple divorce case amounts to 248 Euros in Hungary, but equals
28. Wayne Eastman & P.V. Viswanath, Repeated Interaction, Deep Pockets and
Litigation Spending, (Mar. 1, 2003) (unpublished manuscript), http://web
page.pace.edu/pviswanath/research/papers/litigation .pdf.
29. Id.
30. Emery G. Lee III & Thomas E. Willging, PRELIMINARY REPORT TO THE
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES 35-36 (2009),
http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/dissurvl .pdf/$file/dissurvl .pdf.
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4000 Euros in Italy; for a relatively simple commercial contract
case, in which a company delivered goods for an amount of
20,000 Euros and was not paid because the buyer considers
that the goods were not in conformity, costs vary between 800
Euros (Slovenia) and 9477 Euros (Austria).31 Note that me-
dian and average costs obscure the fact that for certain catego-
ries of cases, costs are typically much larger.32 For example,
Polinsky and Shavell discuss the high costs of the product lia-
bility system: "[f]or each dollar that an accident victim re-
ceives, two dollars of legal expenses are incurred. In all, the
tort system and thus the product liability system is very expen-
sive.133 For every dollar paid in compensation to a victim, at
least one dollar is paid in litigation costs.34 According to the
Lawyers for Civil Justice, outside legal fees and costs for For-
tune 200 companies increased from an average of $66 million
in 2000 to nearly $115 million in 2008.3 5 Costs are also quite
high in England.3 6 A report drafted by Lord Justice Sir Rupert
Jackson, entitled Review of Civil Litigation Costs,3 7 provides an
overview of the relationship between the costs paid to claim-
31. See Demolin Brulard Barthelemy, STUDY ON THE TRANSPARENCY OF
COSTS OF CML JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION, at 287-289,
291293, https://e-justice.europa.eu/content-costsof-proceedings-37-en
.do.
32. For many disputes, the costs are much lower. For an older study, see
David M. Trubek et al., The Costs of Ordinary Litigation, 31 UCLA L. REv. 72,
92 (1983). The authors found that the legal fees in the world of ordinary
litigation were modest. In half the cases the nominal fees were under $1000;
only in 8% of the cases were fees larger than $10,000.
33. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The Uneasy Case for Product Lia-
bility, 123 HARv. L. REV. 1437, 1470 (2010).
34. Id. Similar findings are presented byJohnny Hersch & W. Kip Viscusi,
Tort Liability Litigation Costs for Commercial Claims, 9 Am. L. & ECON. REV. 330
(2007).
35. LAWYERS FOR CIVIL JUSTICE ET AL., LITIGATION COST SURVEY OF MAJOR
COMPANIES 7 (2010), https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&
source=web&cd=l &ved=OahUKEwjSxMqh0qLAhWEqh4KHeCzAI4QFggd
MAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.uscourts.gov%2Ffile%2Fdocuncn t%2Fliti
gation cost survey major companice&urg--AFQj CNI IgUXsuDpsCZj hpXZW-
C-gSxeXbnA&sig2=dPhO5Ozg75x5JiC4FckCRg&cad=rja. Note figure 3, show-
ing that not every Fortune 200 company reported costs to the LCJ. Id.
36. Note that England has a system of fee shifting.
37. See RupertJackson, REVIEW OF CIVIL LITIGATION CosTs: FINAL REPORT
(2009), https://www.judiciary.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/JCO/Docu
ments/Reports/ackson-final-report-1401 10.pdf.
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ants and damages. The report38 distinguishes between cases in
which conditional fee arrangements (CFA) apply and cases in
which such arrangements do not apply.3 9 With respect to dis-
trict court cases, claimant costs amounted to approximately
158% of damages in CFA cases won by claimants. In non-CFA
cases, claimant costs amounted to approximately 51% of dam-
ages.40 Regarding circuit court cases, the total costs paid to
claimants were on average 203% of the damages paid to the
claimants in CFA cases. In non-CFA cases, the total costs paid
to claimants were on average 55% of the damages paid to
claimants.41 Further interesting data comes from insurers con-
cerning personal injury claims. The average costs in cases
worth below £5000 that were settled amounted to almost three
time the average damages. Average costs also exceeded aver-
age damages in claims between £5000 and £15,000. For claims
of very high value (over £100,000), costs were more propor-
tionate (just over 20% of damages on average) 42 So especially
for plaintiffs with relatively small claims (up to £15,000), the
costs of claiming may be prohibitive.
43
38. The report is based inter alia on Hazel Genn, REVIEW OF CIVIL LITIGA-
TION COSTS: PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS OF COSTS DATA (2009), https://www.ucl.
ac.uk/laws/judicial-institute/events/Jackson-Costs-Review-Preliminary.An
alysis of CostsData_.pdf.
39. A CFA is an agreement in which a lawyer agrees with his or her client
to be paid a success fee in the event of the client's claim succeeding, and the
success fcc is not calculated as a proportion of the amount recovered by the
client. A typical example of a CFA is a 'no win, no fee' agreement.
40. Jackson attributes this difference partly to the type of cases CFAs at-
tract.
41. JACKSON, supra note 37, at 16.
42. JACKSON, supra note 37, at 18.
43. Many other studies confirm the high costs of the tort litigation sys-
tem. Most of those studies refer to defendants' costs. For an overview see
Ben C.J. van Velthoven, Empirics of Tort, in TORT LAW AND ECONOMICS,
470-71 (Michael Faure ed., 2009). With respect to the Netherlands, Croes
and Van Os provide a detailed analysis of the costs of litigation for plaintiffs
and discuss an example in which a plaintiff has a conflict with a shop con-
cerning particular furniture with which he was not satisfied and which has a
value of C3000. They estimate that the total costs for the plaintiff could
amount to C2192.02. If the plaintiff were to win and the defendant con-
victed to pay the plaintiff's costs, the defendant would pay a maximum of
only C875, still leaving the plaintiff with substantial costs. If the plaintiff were
to lose, in addition to having to pay his own costs, he could equally be con-
victed to pay the costs of the defendant (up to a maximum of C875). In the
latter case, his total costs could be higher than the value of the furniture he
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B. Budget Constraints
Logically, the more substantial the costs of litigation are,
the higher is the chance that individuals will not have suffi-
cient wealth or liquid assets to pursue a claim. Unsurprisingly,
experts estimate that four-fifths of people with low income in
the United States have no access to an attorney when they
need one.44 However, budget constraints are not only a prob-
lem for individuals, but also for some companies. Consider two
companies who are litigating over a failed business venture.45
For one company, the business venture was one of many it pur-
sues each year and the amount at stake is just a small fraction
of the company's assets. For the other company however, the
business venture was central to the company's development
and all of its financial resources were devoted to it. While the
large company will often be able to hire the best counsel
money can buy, the smaller company will likely be unable to
gather the financial resources necessary to hire top counsel to
litigate the case.
C. Consequences of High Costs and Budget Constraints
There are two important consequences of the fact that liti-
gation is (sometimes very) costly. First, many claims cannot be
brought to court because their expected benefit (the
probability of winning multiplied by the award in case of a vic-
tory) is smaller than their costs.4 6 In other words, these claims
have negative expected value. From a societal point of view,
this is not a problem for weak cases, but many meritorious
cases also suffer from this problem. When deserving plaintiffs
do not bring suit they go uncompensated. This lowers the ex-
pected cost of engaging in activities that pose a risk to individ-
uals with low wealth, which results in suboptimal deterrence of
purchased. See M.T. Croes & R.M.V. van Os, De kosten van procedures: Gedrag-
skeuzen in de delta van geschillenbeslechting, WODC MEMORANDUMt 2012-7, at 29,
https://www.wodc.ni/onderzoeksdatabase/2115-kosten-van-een-rechtszaak
.aspx?cp=44&cs=6800.
44. Editorial, Addressing the Justice Gap, N.Y. TiMES, Aug. 23, 2011, at A22.
45. For a similar example, see Jonathan T. Molot, The Feasibility of Litiga-
tion Markets, 89 IND. L.J., 175-76 (2014).
46. Note that since lawsuits often involve a lot of uncertainty for claim-
ants, even cases in which the statistically correct expected benefit of the case
is larger than the costs may not be brought because of risk aversion.
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wrongful behavior in such activities.47 Rubin and Shepherd
find indeed that there is less deterrence of wrongful behavior
directed towards lower income groups.
48
Second, even when claims have positive expected value, a
plaintiff may be unable to pursue the claim because he or she
does not have the minimal funds required to do so. Similarly, a
plaintiff may have enough funds to bring the claim to court,
but not enough funds to invest in the case as vigorously as he
or she would have absent the budget constraint (X in the
model above). That is the point we will develop in sections III
and IV. Suboptimal investment or a complete lack of invest-
ment may once again result in meritorious cases going un-
dercompensated, with suboptimal deterrence as a conse-
quence. Here, third-party financing can play an important role
by removing the budget constraint. With respect to Burford,
one of the largest providers of capital for litigation and arbitra-
tion in the world, Molot (2014) writes: "[a]lthough Burford's
capital has been used by different businesses for different pur-
poses, as a general matter Burford's financing has enabled
those businesses to retain higher-quality counsel and/or
mount a more vigorous prosecution of a case than would have
been pursued in some form even without Burford financing.
Each of the lawsuits that Burford financed likely would have
been pursued in some form even without Burford financ-
ing."
49
We now turn to the question how budget constraints af-
fect the parties' investment in litigation and the plaintiff's ex-
pected value.
47. SeeJoseph Franaszek, Justice and the Reduction of Litigation Costs: A Dif-
ferent Perspective, 37 RUTGERS L. Rev. 337 (1985).
48. Paul I. Rubin &Joanna M. Shepherd, The Demographics of Tort Reform,
4 REv. L. & ECON. 591, 615-16 (2008). For a general analysis of a failing
deterrent effect of the tort system in particular circumstances, see Steven
Shavell, Liability for Harm versus Regulation of Safety, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 357
(1984); see also Michael Faure & Franziska Weber, Dispersed Losses in Tort
Law -An Economic Analysis, 6J. EUR. TORT L. 163 (2015) and, with an appli-
cation to consumer law, see Michael Faure, Anthony Ogus & Niels Philipsen,
Curbing Consumer Financial Losses: the Economics of Regulatory Enforcement 31 L,
& POL'Y 161, 181-82 (2009).
49. Molot, supra note 45, at 179-80.
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III.
THE MODEL
We first describe the structure of the game-theoretic
model. Note that all symbols we used before retain their origi-
nal meaning. The model in this section adds to the existing
literature by looking at the consequences of a budget con-
straint (B). Both parties select their level of legal effort (X for
the plaintiff and Y for the defendant) once and simultane-
ously. The effort levels are investments made to persuade a
fact-finder. The amount at stake equals J. Both parties are as-
sumed to be risk-neutral. Each contender aims to maximize his
or her expected income. Each party is assumed to be responsi-
ble for his or her own legal expenses regardless of the out-
come (the American rule of cost allocation applies).50 The de-
gree of defendant fault (or actual merit of the claim), F, is
known by both litigants.5 ' Without third-party financing, the
plaintiff faces a budget constraint: his expenditures are
capped at B. Hence, B is the amount that the plaintiff has at
his or her disposal to finance the claim. The defendant does
not face a budget constraint. The unit cost of effort equals Cp
for the plaintiff and Cd for the defendant. The expenditures of
the plaintiff thus equal CpX and of the defendant CdY. We ob-
tain solutions for the litigation efforts under the
Nash-Cournot protocol (which means that the parties choose
their effort levels simultaneously, thus neither party knows the
effort level of the other party when choosing her or his own
effort level).52
The plaintiff wants to maximize her or his expected value:
EVP1 = XF _PX
EV =XF + Y(1 - F) J -@
50. This implies that each party bears his or her own litigation cost, irre-
spective of the outcome of the case.
51. This can be justified by supposing that the facts of the case are made
public during pre-trial discovery. An extension of the model could deal with
the situation in which the parties hold different views of F or J (e.g. the
parties are relatively optimistic).
52. An extension could deal with the situation of bluffing. One party
would then choose his level of effort first, and the other party then needs to
respond to that effort level. In such a case, the Stackelberg equilibrium con-
cept can be used. Since the plaintiff is the one that initiates a lawsuit, it may
be natural to assume that he will often be the one that chooses his effort
level first.
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with X < B




We first look at the equilibrium expenditures53 of the par-
ties when the plaintiff does not face a budget constraint.
The first-order conditions are (these conditions represent
the fact that each party will choose additional effort until the
marginal benefit of this additional effort is equal to the margi-
nal cost of this additional effort) 54:
F(1 - F)YJ Ct (XF + Y(1 - F))2
F(1 - F)XJ = Cd(XF + Y(1 - F))2
From these conditions, it follows that X=(Cd/C)Y: the
plaintiff's effort is directly proportional to the defendant's unit
cost, and inversely proportional to his own unit cost. When the
unit costs of the parties are equal, the plaintiff spends as much
as the defendant regardless of the level of fault (X*=Y* for all
F).
By putting the above result in the first order conditions,





Y* CPF(1 - F)J2 C
The equilibrium expenditures equal:
53. These are the expenditures, which are optimal for each party from
their private point of view.
54. Mathematically, the first derivative of the plaintiff's expected value
and the defendant's expected loss is set equal to zero.
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CPF(1 - F)J
C(F+ CP(1-F))2
C Y* CPF(1 - F)J
C,
Cd(F + f(1-F) )2
The expenditures of the plaintiff equal the expenditures
of the defendant. The expenditures increase with the amount
at stake J. When the unit costs of the parties are the same, the
expenditures are highest for close cases (F=1/2) and lowest
for cases with extreme high or low merit (F=0 and F=I).




and thus equals the merits of the case (F) when the unit costs
of the parties are equal (Ppl=F when CpCd).
The expected value of the plaintiff and the expected loss
of the defendant equal respectively:
F CPF(1-F)
C
F+ C(1-F) Cd(F + -P (1- F))2
Cd Cd
EVdef F CPF(1 - F)
F + C P (I1- F)c CQF+ +- (1-F) )2
Cd Cd'
Now we look at what changes when the plaintiff faces a
budget constraint B, as a result of which they may not be able
to adopt an effort level of X* and thus invest an amount of
CpX*.
Obviously, when B = CpX*, the effort levels of the parties
remain X* and Y*. In that case, the plaintiff has sufficient
funds to adopt an effort of X*. In the opposite case however,
thus when B < CpX*, the plaintiff cannot choose X* and is
forced to choose a lower effort. We can easily see that the
plaintiff will choose an effort level equal to B/Cp: between an
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effort of zero and X*, his expected value is increasing con-
cavely for all values where:
a 2EV =2 YF 2(1 - F)
aX (XF+ Y(1-F))<
Consequently, if X* is not possible, the maximum possible ef-
fort level B/Cp is the next best thing for the plaintiff. Given
that the plaintiff chooses an effort level of B/Cp from the sec-
ond first-order condition it follows that the defendant chooses




So when the plaintiff faces a budget constraint, the parties'





The total litigation expenditures are smaller without the
budget constraint than with the budget constraint when the
following conditions are satisfied:
F(1-F)BJ BF
2CPF( - F)J <B+Cd Cpc Cp





With respect to the first inequality, the left hand side rep-
resents the sum of the litigation expenditures of the plaintiff
and the defendant when there is no budget constraint. The
right hand side represents the sum of the plaintiff's and the
defendant's expenditures when the plaintiff faces a budget
Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of Law & Business
NYU JOURNAL OF LAW & BUSINESS
constraint. The second inequality represents the fact that the
plaintiff will not lack funds for all cases. Whether the plaintiff
lacks funds or not depends on the amount at stake, the unit
costs of the parties and the merits of the case (see the right-
hand side of the second inequality, which is simply equal to
the plaintiffs optimal expenditure level). Suppose the plaintiff
has funds equal to $20,000. When the merits of the case equal
0.8 (a rather strong case), the amount at stake equals
$100,000, and the unit costs of the plaintiff and the defendant
are the same, then the plaintiff would normally spend $16,000,
and he can do so without third-party funding. However, if all
would remain the same, except that the merits of the case are
now equal to 0.5, then the plaintiff would normally want to
spend $25,000. This time, he is not able to spend this amount,




Given the complexity of the expressions above, it is not
generally possible to compare the outcomes with and without
a budget constraint analytically. We use numerical simulations
to reveal the key differences.
55
A. Total Litigation Expenditures
Figures 1, 2, and 3 below respectively look at the situation
in which the inherent quality of the claim is most uncertain
(F=1/2),56 is relatively high (F=0.7),57 and is relatively low
55. For a similar approach in the context of all-or-nothing rules and pro-
portionate damages, see De Mot & Miceli, Comparing All-or-Nothing, supra
note 9, and in the context of the suppression of the product rule in litiga-
tion, see Jef De Mot & Thomas Miceli, Litigation and the Product Rule: A Rent-
SeekingApproach (Univ. of Conn. Dep't of Econ. Working Paper Series, Work-
ing Paper No. 2015-13, 2015). Note that we abstract away from princi-
pal-agent problems in the model and the discussion. We implicitly assume
that funder and plaintiff are able to select the investment level that maxi-
mizes the sum of the plaintiff's share and the funder'5 share.
56. The formulas are (0.5*x)/((0.5+x*0.5)A2)<y+2*(sqrt(0.25*(y/x)) -
(0.5*(y/x)) and y<x*0.25/(0.5+x*0.5)A2.
57. The formulas are 2*x*(0.21/(0.7+x*0.3)A2)<y+3.333* (sqrt(0.21*y/
x)-0.7*y/x) and y<x*0.21/(0.7+x*0.3)A2.
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(F=0.3).58 The x-axis represents the unit costs of the plaintiff
Cp, and the y-axis the plaintiffs budget constraint B. The de-
fendant's unit costs have been set equal to 1. The light-green
area represents the combinations of Cp and B for which the
budget constraint condition is satisfied:
C PF(1 -F)J
C
Cd (F + C (1-F))
2
C5d
The grey area represents the condition for which the total trial
expenditures are smaller without the budget constraint than
with the budget constraint
F(1- F)BJ BF




not taking into account the requirement for the budget con-
straint. The intersection of these areas, the dark green area, is
what we are interested in. The reason is simple: if the budget
constraint condition is not satisfied, the plaintiff can spend his
optimal expenditure level and will not have to spend a lower
amount.
58. The formulas are 2*x*(0.21/(0.3+x*0.7)A2)<y+(10/ 7 )* (sqrt
(0.21*y/x)-0.3*y/x) and y<x*0.21/ (0.3+x*0.7) A2.
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Interestingly, the ability of the plaintiff to spend more is
more likely to reduce total litigation expenditures for quite
strong claims than for weaker claims. Intuitively, this makes
sense. For weak claims, when the plaintiff spends more due to
vanishing budget constraints, the case becomes closer, and it
becomes more worthwhile for the defendant to spend addi-
tional resources as well. For relatively strong claims, when the
plaintiff spends more, the case becomes even less close and it
becomes less valuable for the defendant to spend more.
Note further that litigation expenditures can only be
lower without the budget constraint when Cp is relatively low
compared to Cd (which is 1 here). Intuitively, total expendi-
tures can only decrease when the decrease in the defendant's
expenditures (if there is a decrease at all) is larger than the
increase in the plaintiffs expenditures.
Summarizing, third-party financing may thus decrease to-
tal litigation expenditures for claims that are quite strong and
for which the unit costs of the plaintiff remain relatively low
compared to the unit costs of the defendant. However, total
litigation expenditures may also increase due to third-party fi-
nancing. This will especially be the case when cases are rela-
tively weak or-even when the case is relatively strong-for
cases in which the unit costs of the plaintiff are relatively high
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compared to the unit costs of the defendant. In the next sub-
section, we look at which types of cases TPF actually promotes
(in terms of the strength of the case and the relative unit costs
of the parties). From a societal point of view, it would be most
interesting if TPF promotes especially strong claims. Indeed,
the possibility to pursue strong claims more vigorously can im-
prove the deterrent function of the law.
B. The Plaintiffs Expected Value of Trial
Third-party financing relaxes budget constraints (see sec-
tion II.B.). An important question is which types of disputes
(strength of the case, unit costs of the parties) third-party fi-
nancing is likely to promote. Without a budget constraint, the
plaintiff's expected value at trial equals:
F CPF(1 - F)
F+ C(1-F) Cd(F+C (1 -F)) 2
C, Cd





Figures 4, 5, and 6 all visualize for which claims the difference
between the plaintiff's expected value without and with budget
constraints is largest. The figures respectively look at the situa-
tion in which the unit costs of the plaintiff and defendant are
both equal to one,59 the situation in which the unit cost of the
plaintiff equals two and the unit cost of the defendant one,60
and the situation in which the unit cost of the plaintiff equals
one and the unit cost of the defendant two.61 Figure A always
looks at the cases for which the difference is larger than
twenty-five percent of the amount at stake, and figure B at the
cases for which the difference is larger than forty percent of
59. x-x*(-x)-((yx/(sqrt(x*(1-x)*y))-y)>0. 25 or 0.4 and y<x*(1-x).
60. x/(x+2* (l-x))-2*x* (1-x) / (2-x)A2-( (0.5*x*y/(sqrt(x* (1-x) *y*0.5) )-
y)>0.25 or 0.4 and y<2*x*(1-x)/(2-x)A2.
61. x/(x+0.5* (1-x))-0.5*x* (i-x)/ (x+0.5* (1-x)) A2-( (y*x/(sqrt(x* (1-
x)*y*0.5))-y)>O.25 or 0.4 and y<0.5*x*(1-x)/(x+0.5*(1-x))A2.
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the amount at stake. The x-axis represents the inherent quality
of the case (F), and the y-axis the budget constraint (B). The
light green area represents the budget constraint condition,
the dark green area the combinations of B and F for which the
plaintiff's expected value is larger without the budget con-
straint. The area we are interested in is the intersection of
both areas (which is once again the dark gray area, because
the second area is fully covered by the first area).
FIGURES 
4 A AND 4B.
FIGURES 5A AND 5B.
UNIT COSTS PLAINTIFF=UNIT COSTS
DEFENDANT 1
UNIT COSTS PLAINTIFF=2; UNIT COSTS
DEFENDANT
= 1
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FIGURES 6A AND 6B. UNIT COSTS PLAINTIFF=I; UNIT COSTS
DEFENDANT=2
Case quality F Case quality F
The figures show that especially relatively strong claims
have a higher expected pay-off without the budget constraint.
The expected value of claims with a high F increases the most
when TPF is available. Intuitively, for strong claims, the in-
crease in the expected judgment (through the increase in the
plaintiff's probability of winning) due to the additional effort
exerted by the plaintiff outweighs the costs of this extra effort.
Note further that this is especially the case when the plaintiff's
unit costs are smaller than the defendant's unit costs (the dark
green area is largest in Figure VI). Interestingly, the types of
claims that are stimulated the most (strong ones with relatively
low unit costs for the plaintiff) are the ones for which total
expenditures often decrease.
C. Implications
Our analysis shows that third-party funders will mainly be
interested in funding claims with a high value of F. Recall that
F stands for the defendant's fault. Hence, the higher F, the
more meritorious the plaintiff's claim is. At first sight, this is a
good thing. The social value of litigating weaker claims is
doubtful or outright negative. And if more meritorious suits
can be brought to court, potential tortfeasors may adapt their
behavior to society's advantage (taking more care in a tort set-
ting, breaching contract only when breach is efficient, etc.).
From an empirical perspective, Chen recently found that
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third-party funding indeed results in or attracts higher quality
suits.6 2 The author uses a data set containing detailed financial
information over a recent seven-year period for the Insolvency
Management Fund Ltd. (IMF), the world's largest litigation
funding firm. This company had $2.06 billion in claim value in
2011. More concrete, while funded cases were reversed twenty-
five percent of the time, cases that sought funding but were
rejected by IMF were reversed thirty-one percent of the time.
63
Molot notes that Burford's win-loss ratio so far exceeds eighty
percent.6
4
However, our analysis also shows that third-party funders
obtain the highest profits when funding cases with the highest
values of F. As Shepherd points out, the goal of third-party
investors is not to improve access to justice for financially con-
strained or risk-averse plaintiffs, but rather to maximize the
returns from their investment. The author argues that the
cases with the largest potential return are often the cases
where the existing substantive law advantages plaintiffs.65 Ac-
cording to Shepherd, these cases are the opposite of the sort
of cases where financing could improve access to justice for
vulnerable plaintiffs. She illustrates this with the fact that
Juridica, a funder financing large commercial litigation, regu-
larly invests in patent infringement and price-fixing cases, and
Burford Capital in multi-party litigation, and sums up several
reasons why the underlying substantive law in these types of
cases creates imbalances that generally favor plaintiffs.66 Our
findings partly confirm Shepherd's results. Cases with a high
level of F will not only be cases in which the true quality of the
62. Daniel L. Chen, Can Markets Stimulate Rights? On the Alienability of Le
gal Claims, 46 RAND J. ECON., 23, 49 (2015) [hereinafter Chen, Can Markets
Stimulate Rights?].
63. Id. Note that Chen stresses the limitations of his data and research
design. Id. at 52.
64. Molot, supra note 45, at 181 n.40.
65, Note that due to the increased economies of scale, funders are able
to bring some cases contingency fee lawyers cannot bring, even some cases
with a relatively large probability of success.
66. Among other reasons: the risk of significant losses at trial including
treble d~mages and the possibility Of prelimninAry in jinctinnq in p'at-nt in,
fringement cases; joint-and-several liability rules that prohibit proportional
liability and rules against contribution in price-fixing cases.
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case is large, but also cases in which the law advantages plain-
tiffs, for example through asymmetric burdens of proof.
6 7
Our model also shows that funders will be interested in
cases in which the unit costs of the plaintiff are relatively low
compared to the unit costs of the defendant. Consequently,
funders will not invest in cases in which access to evidence or
good arguments are relatively difficult for the plaintiff, despite
the fact that the inherent quality of the case is large. Conse-
quently, within the contours of our model, funders will shy
away from cases with ambiguous legal questions. In line with
this, Juridica reportedly rejects "claims that raise novel legal
questions or that will probably end up before a jury" (Glater,
2009).68 Also, Abrams and Chen (2013) found that funders
prefer cases that are likely to settle quickly, because the longer
and more complex a matter is, the greater their risk.69 One
funder would only invest in cases with a ninety-five percent
probability of winning. In contrast with this however, Chen
(2015) recently found that funded cases are being cited much
more often than cases that sought funding and were rejected,
but still made it to trial (eleven versus five citations on aver-
age). He concludes that litigation funders may prefer new and
novel issues for funding. Chen explains this result with a prin-
cipal-agent framework where litigation funders provide exper-
tise in reducing uncertainty in law firms' disutility of produc-
tion. Our findings contradict Chen's finding. In our model,
die result that funding may especially increase the value of a
claim when the unit costs of the plaintiff are small compared
to the unit costs of the defendant C p < Cd, can be interpreted
(inter alia) as a lack of interest of funders in new and novel
issues: given the doctrine of stare decisis, it is usually much
mole difficult to find arguments in favor of creating a new pre-
67. Interestingly, in patent infringement cases, patents are presumptively
valid as a matter of law. A defendant needs to prove that a patent is invalid
by a standard of clear and convincing evidence. The plaintiff on the other
hand must only prove infringement by a standard of preponderance of the
evidence. See e.g., Christopher Harkins, Fending Off Paper Patents and Patent
Trolls: A Novel "Cold Fusion" Defense Because Changing Times Demand It, 17 ALB.
L.J. Sc. & TECH 437 (2007).
68. Jonathan D. Glater, Investing in Lawsuits, for a Share of the Awards, N.Y.
TIMEs, June 3, 2009, at B1.
69. Chen & Abrams, A Market for Justice, supra note 2, at 1088.
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cedent than finding arguments against it (Cr > C). Note that
Chen stresses the limitations of his data and research design.
70
Finally, the influence of third-party funding on total ex-
penditures also influences the settlement rate. Since total ex-
penditures may drop for strong claims, the settlement fre-
quency may drop, given that avoiding trial costs is one of the
main reasons of settlement. So the reduction of expenditures
for strong claims is not an unambiguous welfare effect. It may
come at the expense of more trials relative to settlements. For
weak claims, the situation is the opposite. Due to increasing
total expenditures, third-party financing may lead to more set-
tlement.
CONCLUSION
We have formally compared the litigation investments of
parties and the expected value of the plaintiffs claim with
budget constraints (no TPF) and without budget constraints
(TPF). Our results highlight three facts. First, total expendi-
tures do not necessarily increase with funding due to the stra-
tegic interaction between the plaintiff's and the defendant's
effort levels. The idea that TPF would unambiguously lead to
an overall increase of litigation costs is hence not supported by
our analysis. Total expenditures are less likely to increase the
larger the quality of the claim. Second, funders will generally
be interested in funding strong cases rather than weak cases.
Moreover, TPF companies can make the highest profits when
funding the strongest cases, including those cases in which
plaintiffs are already advantaged, for example by asymmetric
burdens of proof. Third, funders can make the highest profits
in cases in which the plaintiff's unit costs of litigation are
smaller than the defendant's unit costs. This may help to ex-
plain the lack of interest of funders in claims with novel issues.
In conclusion, TPF can play an important role as an in-
strument to promote access to justice in addition to other in-
struments aimed at achieving the same goal. Given that TPF
especially finances strong claims, society's interest and the pri-
vate interest of funders may align to a considerable extent.
However, funders primarily act out of profit maximization
objectives and are not inherently interested in promoting so-
70. Chen, Can Markets Stimulate Rights?, supra note 62, at 52.
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cial goals (like access to justice). It is therefore still possible
that in some instances funders may focus on cases in which
plaintiffs are already so advantaged by the law that additional
funding may further distort the imbalance between the liti-
gants. Finally, it is interesting that funders will generally be in-
terested in those cases in which funding will not .necessarily
increase total expenditures. This is however not an unambigu-
ous welfare benefit, given that it may decrease the settlement
frequency.
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